Chapter 53 – John
Accounts of the Anzac attack of 2 May vary in key details.
Roland Perry describes John Monash’s experiences before and during the Anzac attack of 2 May 1915 in his biography Monash: The Outsider Who Won a War . (pp. 189-192). The following details are included:
p. 189 – In late April 1915, Generals Birdwood and Godley pushed for an attack on the high ground of Baby 700. Monash agreed with the principle and had been saying it since 26 April, but Godley’s strategy was “sketchy”. British General Walker had taking over the 1st Brigade since MacLauren’s death and refused to participate in the attack as he knew Godley well and how unprepared he was.
p. 190 – General Bridges, commander of the 1st Division (1st, 2nd and 3rd Brigades) took General Walker’s advice and refused to endorse the plan. Monash submitted a different plan based on his own reconnaissance. Godley and Birdwood insisted on continuing with a plan that had been developed around a much larger attacking force, even though neither of them came to see the terrain for themselves. Monash was given the final plan at 2:15pm on 2 May, just five hours before the attack was to commence. The attack was to involve the New Zealand and Australian Division, being the New Zealand Brigade and Monash’s 4th Australian Brigade. Monash felt he could not disobey orders. When attacking the Australians cheered, and sang “Australia will be there” and “It’s a long way to Tipperary.”
191 – The New Zealanders attacked 90 minutes late. “Friendly fire” from a battery on the beach landed on the 16th Battalion and destroyed 80m of new trenches they had built during the night. Monash resented going into battle without a pretty fair chance of victory
192 – On the morning of 3 May, Monash calculated that his brigade, originally 4000 strong, might be reduced to fewer than 1800 men. That day Monash ordered all of his troops to withdraw from the ground newly gained, some in vulnerable locations had to wait until nightfall to retreat. That afternoon, war correspondent Charles Bean visited Monash and observed that “Monash seemed to me a little shaken”. Bean recorded that Monash said “They have tried to put the work of an Army Corps on me.” (quoted from Bean’s diary).
Charles Bean describes the attack of 2 May 1915 in Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 , vol I (pp. 582-599). The following details are included:
P.485 – “Looking forward to this campaign, each man had, some weeks previously, drawn his pay in English gold or in ten shilling notes specially overprinted in Turkish script with their value in piastres.” Men expected to advance and not entrench for a long stay.
p. 548 – Map 22 is a detailed topographical map that shows all mentioned locations, including the location of Monash’s dugout as “4 AI Bde HQ” in Monash Valley below Courtney’s Post. This map also shows the location of the “NZ Inf Bde HQ” on Walker’s Ridge near Russell’s Top.
p. 583 – Bean’s account is silent on any disagreement that may have occurred between commanders prior to the attack, but provides an explanation that the 1st Division contribution was withdrawn from the attack plan as the risks were considered to be too high.
p.585 – Bean lists eight warships that fired upon Baby 700 for a quarter of an hour, and states “The sound of the bombardment which opened at dusk was the heaviest that Australian troops had ever heard.”
p. 586 – “The sound of the bombardment overhead was inspiring”. When it ceased “scarcely a sound penetrated the depths of the valley”. The men sang “Tipperary” and “Australia Will Be There”, the sound of their voices and cheers “carried far down the valley to Brigade Headquarters.” When the men climbed to the top of the ridge, “a heavy fire was opened on them.”
Charles Bean includes a description of the Nek as being “not thirty yards wide” in Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 , vol II (p. 464).
Ernest Scott includes the words and music for the song “Australia Will Be There” in Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18 , vol XI (Australia During the War), on p. 218 and the plate following.
Peter Pederson, in Monash as a Military Commander , describes the details of Monash’s proposal as included, such as which Battalion would attack from each location and in what direction, distribution of 200,000 rounds of ammunition by 1:00pm, feeding the men two hours before the attack and planning for resupply by mule afterwards (pp. 71-72).
Alan Smithers, in Sir John Monash , notes that the attack of 2 May 1915 was held at dusk due to a lack of artillery for cover (p. 89), that the plan was for ship’s guns to open at 7:00pm, and machine guns and rifles to join in at 7:10pm (p. 90). Monash reflected afterwards that the objectives chosen from a map were far to ambitious and that attacking at night made the task impossible (p. 93).